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The Case for Civil Antitrust Enforcement*
By SIGMUND TnIBERG* *
To my way of thinking, the substantive law of antitrust and the
American business scene have both developed in such a way as to
make criminal proceedings, in many situations, an archaic method
of antitrust enforcement and a confession of governmental impo-
tence rather than a symbol of governmental power. Many situations
of antitrust misbehavior should, of course, continue to be dealt
with by criminal sanctions. And the choice of civil remedies for
antitrust violation does not imply that antitrust has lost its status
as the dominant economic philosophy in this country. It means only
that antitrust's primary significance is in the area of public policy,
and that its role in condemning private business irregularities is
in many cases a matter of secondary significance.
It has been the fashion to put the case for civil, as opposed to
criminal, enforcement of the antitrust laws by pleading, on an ad
hominem basis, the good intentions of the business men involved;
that a Sherman Act violation is only a minor strand in the other-
wise high-minded, public-spirited, and blameless life of the anti-
trust offender; that liability is frequently based on largely "ar-
chaeological" research into the ancient history of the companies
involved," and on uncertain and shifting appraisals of the governing
law, etc. 2 I intend to spend little time on these considerations, be-
cause they relate largely to the particular circumstances of indi-
vidual violations.
Let me state the case for civil antitrust enforcement primarily
in terms of the government's and the public's need for effective
enforcement of a law which represents, in the word of a Fortune
article, "a valiant attempt to extend the Anglo-Saxon common
code, the source and measure of the liberties of the English-speak-
ing people, into the realm of business." As this same source has
said: - "Few acts of idealism have ever turned out so well.' 3
From a strictly evidentiary and procedural standpoint, the
* Based on a talk given to the annual meeting of the Judicial conference
for the Third Circuit, at Atlantic City, New Jersey, on October 7, 1953.
** Member of the New York and U. S. Supreme Court bars; formerly Chief,
Judgment and Judgment Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, and Secre-
tary, United Nations Committee on Restrictive Business Practices.
1 See, Judge A. N. Hand, Trid Efficiency, C.CII. 1951 Symposium on
Business Practices under Federal Antitrust Laws, pp. 31-2. "Doubtless,
long-tolerated trade arrangements acquire no vested immunity under the
Sherman Act; no prescriptive rights accrue by the prosecutor's delay." The
Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United States, U.S. (1953).
2 See statement of District Judge Knox on sentencing the defendants in
United States v. General Electric ("Carboloy"), S. D. N. Y. C. R. 110-412,
November 12, 1948, F. 2992-5.
3 ForrT, The New Competition, June 1952, p. 195.
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government faces several severe disadvantages in a criminal anti-
trust proceeding that it would not encounter in a civil suit. Should
the defendant avail himself of his constitutional right to a jury
trial, the government assumes the burden of convincing twelve
jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sherman Act has been
violated. Considering the unwieldly masses of economic evidence
and the elaborate technical arguments that must be fused, in the
lay juror's mind, into the simple psychological intuition of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, a criminal jury proceeding has been
well described by an able defense attorney as an "uphill fight for
government counsel." 4
In some criminal cases, the court has not even allowed the
jury to weigh the evidence and decide whether it leads to the infer-
ence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. These courts have applied
strictly the rule that limits the use of circumstantial evidence in
a criminal case; accordingly, if the evidence does not exclude all
reasonable hypotheses except guilt, they have held that there is not
sufficient evidence to go to the jury.5 There are other cases holding
that it is not permissible thus to substitute the judge for the jury;6
nevertheless, this is still another obstacle to effective criminal anti-
trust prosecutions.
If the case goes to the jury, the government's opportunities to
offer evidence which judges will consider competent and admis-
sible are much more restricted than in equity cases. In jury cases,
the judge reverts to his time-honored function of protecting sus-
ceptible and uninformed jurors from hearing evidence which he
would freely admit in a civil equity proceeding involving no jury.
A federal judge in an equity case needs no protection in evaluating
the relevance and materiality of evidence, since he can be trusted
subsequently to dismiss from his mind evidence that turns out to
be unconnected or of low probative value. On the other hand, in
contrast to the relative disability of the government, defendants
in criminal cases, are accorded, it has been asserted, greater op-
portunity to introduce self-serving evidence.7
Moreover, government counsel have no right to insist on tak-
4 Duncan, The "Big Case" -When Tried Crimnally, 4 Wr'sTM RrsrrvE L.
RPv. 99, 116 (1953).
S Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U. S. 942 (1950) (antitrust case); United States v. Maryland &
Virginia Milk Producers' Ass'n., 90 F. Supp. 681 (D.D.C. 1950 (antitrust case);
U. S. v. Tatcher, 131 F.2d 1002 (C.C.A. 3, 1942); Copeland v. U. S., 90 F.2d 78
(5th Cir. 1937); United States v. Gasomiser Corp., 7 F.R.D. 712 (D. Del. 1947).6 United States v. Spagnuolo, 168 F.2d 768 (2nd Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U. S. 824 (1948); United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (2nd Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 322 U. S. 726 (1944); United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362
(2nd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 761 (1948); Curley v. United States, 10
F.2d 229 (D. C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 837 (1947).
7 See supra, footnote 4 at pages 112-114.
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ing depositions in criminal cases (as they may in civil cases), be-
cause of the defendant's constitutional privilege of confrontation;
defense counsel, on the other hand, retain this right. Bearing in
mind all of these factors, it is small wonder that the government
has obtained guilty verdicts in little more than half the criminal
cases that have gone to trial; the government's percentage of vic-
tories in civil litigated cases is considerably higher.
In addition to its disadvantages in the trial of criminal antitrust
cases, the government is precluded from appealing cases it loses in
the trial court. As you know, the court in a criminal proceeding
has the power to dismiss a case, or order a directed verdict. Fur-
thermore, jury verdicts of acquittal may be largely based on a
lengthy and complicated judge's charge involving a confusing blend
of economic and legal considerations. In all such situations, the
heavy intellectual and financial investment of the government in
investigating, laying the groundwork for, and prosecuting a criminal
proceeding - not to speak of the equally strenuous efforts of the
defense counsel - dissipates into thin air. There is not even ob-
tained, as in the case of a civil appeal, any clarification of the state
and significance of the law.
There is still another procedural matter that can on occasion
serve to make a criminal proceeding a cumbersome method of iso-
lating the main issues at stake in an antitrust controversy. The pre-
trial conference procedure has been regarded as essential to the
streamlining and clarification of otherwise incredibly ponderous
antitrust cases. Necessary as it is in cases tried by judges, it be-
comes even more important when delicate economic issues are con-
fided to the ultimate judgment of a lay jury. While pre-trial con-
ferences are within the control of the judge in civil cases, counsel
may block their utilization in criminal proceedings.
Even where a case is tried without a jury, the substantive con-
tent of an antitrust violation imposes a difficult burden of proof
on government counsel in a criminal proceeding. Let me deal first
with the so-called "intent" requisite to a Sherman Act violation,
which is about the last vestige of contact that antitrust enforcement
has with the psychology of the antitrust defendant. Although still
a semantic necessity, this "intent" is now a logically redundant
concept. Thus, according to Justice Douglas in the Griffith case.
"it is not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade
or build a monopoly in order to find that the antitrust laws have
been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly
results as the consequence of a defendant's conduct or business ar-
rangements." s Such a standard, stripped of any element of mens
SUnited States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 108 (1948); United States v.
Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 543 (1913).
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rea or personal diabolism, is, I think, much too pallid and conceptual
to make the ordinary judge or jury easy about finding criminal
liability in the first place, or awarding adequate criminal penalties
in the second.
In monopoly cases, the standard has become even more con-
ceptual and depersonalized. Judge Learned Hand, in the Alcoa
case, established that there was no necessity for showing any
"specific intent" to violate the Sherman law. The only intent needed
is the intention to do the forbidden act, i.e., to monopolize; accord-
ingly, Alcoa violated the law by increasing its capacity before others
entered the field, and by progressively embracing each new busi-
ness opportunity as it offered itself.9 Mr. Justice Burton, in the
American Tobacco case,10 further watered down the criminal nu-
ances of Sherman Act intent by grounding a monopoly conviction
on the existence in the defendant of the power to exclude competi-
tors, coupled with the intention and purpose to use that power; the
Schine case has subsequently reaffirmed this view.11
District Judge Wyzanski, in the United Shoe case, has crystal-
lized this trend by pointing out that normal, natural, and "honestly
industrial" activities, of the sort engaged in by honorable firms,
conforming to long-established traditions of the business and not
involving predatory practices, may nevertheless bring about an il-
legal monopoly; for "market control is inherently evil and consti-
tutes a violation of section 2 unless economically inevitable, or
specifically authorized or regulated by law." The violation "de-
pends not on moral considerations, but solely on economic con-
siderations.' 1
2
Criminal sanctions, as a matter of popular taste, call, I think,
for a greater showing of the social cloven hoof or of economic brim-
stone than the foregoing judicial statements would indicate. It is
only when a mere attempt to monopolize is charged, that specific
intent to destroy competition or build monopoly becomes essential
to guilt.13 Since, however, the government rarely, if ever, brings
antitrust cases based exclusively on charges of attempts to mo-
nopolize, this is a relatively unimportant consideration.
If judges are reluctant to impose criminal sanctions without
more robust manifestations of deviltry than many current antitrust
9 United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432
(2nd Cir. 1945).
lOAmerican Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 814 (1946); cf.
Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396 (1905).
1 Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948).
12 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953).
13 See The Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, supra, foot-
note 1 at page 839.
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cases involve, juries are even more reluctant. This is particularly
true where proof of violation is dependent on a technical evaluation
of an elaborate mass of facts and on legal theories that tax even a
federal judge's time, patience, and mental energies. The complexity
of antitrust violations, and their occasional dependence on con-
flicting theories of the relation of law to business society,14 result
in blurring that intuition of personal, conscious, and deliberate
guilt that is at the root of effective criminal law enforcement.
Having shown the decreasing basis for imputing a criminal
intent or mens rea to most antitrust defendants, is there any psy-
chological impressiveness in the concept of antitrust "conspiracy"?
Here, let us first note that a Sherman Act violation does not have
to involve a conspiracy; it suffices under the statutory language
to establish either a contract or a combination to restrain trade.
Thus liability in the Standard Oil of California,15 Richfield'6 and
American Can17 cases was pretty much based on the consistent
use, by a single concern controlling a substantial portion of the
market, of certain standard sales or lease contracts. The govern-
ment's complaint in the Western Electric-A.T.&T. monopoly case
could be viewed as an annotated gloss on four basic contracts or
contract forms, which symbolize the structural pattern of the or-
ganization of the entire Bell System.' Contracts have been held to
be illegal restraints merely on the basis that, as in the case of
movie exhibitor partnerships, they eliminate the competition of the
partners.'9
Likewise, combinations which illegally restrain trade may take
forms from which conventional "cloak-and-dagger" conspiratorial
elements are lacking. Thus, the gravamen of the government's
complaint in the du Pont proceeding currently being tried in Chi-
cago is mainly that members of the du Pont family hold large and
allegedly controlling percentages of stock in General Motors and
United States Rubber.20 In this case, as well as where antitrust
liability is predicated on adherence by defendants to a common
plan (as in the Interstate Circuit2 ' and National Lead22 cases) or
on so-called concerted action (as in the Cement Institute23 and
14 See supra, footnote 2.
15 United States v. Standard Oil of California, 337 U. S. 293 (1949).16United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S. D. Calif. 1951),
2ff'd 343 U. S. 922 (1952)17 United States v. American Can Co., 87 F.Supp. 18 (N. D. Cal. 1949).,
18 D. N. J., Civil Action No. 17-49, filed January 14, 1949.
19 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131 (1948).
20N . D. ]1M. E. D., Civil Action No. 49-C-1071, filed June 30, 1949.
2 1 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939).
22 United States v. National Lead, 332 U. S. 319 (1947).
23 Fed. Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948).
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other basing point and uniform delivered price cases2 4), the ugly
(and logically ineffective) word "conspiracy" could well have been
replaced by the less irritating concept of "combination". Such a
moderate verbal de-emphasis might well have taken the emotional
overtones out of some of the current denunciations by the private
bar of the so-called doctrine of "conscious parallelism," and at the
same time would, from a legal standpoint, have been equally serv-
iceable to the government. 25
In short, in antitrust cases the legal concept of conspiracy has
lost its morally reprobate character. It does not have the personal-
ized criminal innuendoes of the other kinds of conspiracies involved
in Justice Jackson's memorable concurring opinion in the Krule-
wich case.26 Because it lacks this feature of moral reprehensibility,
the modern version of antitrust conspiracy strikes me as a poor
semantic base for criminal proceedings.
Let us now pass from the definition of antitrust crime to the
problem of fixing responsibility for it by taking up the issue of
agency. There is little point in convicting a corporation of a crime,
unless the guilt therein is chargeable to human actors. Of course,
there are situations where individuals are so completely masters of
their corporation's fate that they can, and should, be held criminal-
ly responsible for the criminal aberrations of their corporation. But,
particularly for large corporations, business decisions and acts are
a collective responsibility. A top executive who signs an incrimi-
nating patent licensing agreement is probably acting on the specific
recommendations of several subordinates, who may in turn be
basing themselves on a general policy laid down by an interdepart-
mental committee, perhaps even in part on an opinion of patent
counsel. Or the salesman who has negotiated an offensive "tie-in"
transaction may have been following a company policy that was
more or less anonymously and collectively evolved. Unless a pros-
ecutor is in a position to bring guilt home directly and unequivocal-
ly to specific individuals, he is in a poor position to press criminal
charges.
24 Triangle Conduit and Cable Co. v. Fed. Trade Commission, 168 F.2d
175 (C.C.A. 7, 1948), affd (by equally divided court), 336 U. S. 956 (1949);
Milk and Ice Cream Can Inst. v. Fed. Trade Commission, 152 F.2d 478 (7th
Cir. 1946); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Fed. Trade Commission, 156 F.2d 899
(7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 795 (1946); Allied Paper Mills v.
Fed. Trade Commission, 168 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U. S. 918
(1949).
25A perceptive note writer points out that many of the difficulties found
with the doctrine of "conscious parallelism" flow from the failure to recog-
nize it as related to concentration of economic power, rather than to the
actions of businessmen. Note, - STr. L. REv. 679 (1951).
2 6 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440, 445 et seq (1949).
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This point can be illustrated I think by two cases. A careful
reading of District Judge Lindley's opinion in the A & P case27 gives
one the impression that the enormous record developed in that
case, covering a great number of discriminatory practices similar
to those prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, did not on the
whole strike the judge as meriting criminal condemnation. The
government criminal case was ultimately saved by what Judge
Lindley called the "rotten thread" that permeated the entire course
of A & P's business dealings, to wit: A & P's concurrent use of its
fruit and vegetable produce subsidiary as an agent for the A & P
as buyer, and as a broker for the sellers of the fruit and vegetables.
If not for the outburst of moral indignation engendered by this
abuse of fiduciary position, it seems to me a matter of speculation
whether the government would have won its criminal case.2 8
In the Lumber Products case,29 the majority of the Supreme
Court held that no labor union could be found guilty of acts in-
volving an illegal restraint of trade, unless there was clear proof
that such labor union actually participated in, authorized, or, after
actual knowledge thereof, ratified the unlawful act. This holding
was largely based on the language of the Senate report accom-
panying Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which had said
that "the courts should be required to uphold the long-established
law that guilt is personal" and that "criminal guilt and criminal re-
sponsibility should not be imputed but be proven beyond reasonable
doubt in order to impose liability." In vain did Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Burton, protest that this rule was "unmindful of the anatomy and
physiology of trade union life" and that it enabled powerful interna-
tional unions to "be insulated from responsibility for the acts of their
leading officers, although such action be taken in furtherance of the
vital concerns of the union and in every other aspect of legal respon-
sibility be deemed within the direct authority of these officers and
binding on the union." It is highly doubtful that this issue would
have been handled by the Court in the same way or would have
had the same significance if the case had not been a criminal one,
but had rather been brought on the civil side.
Assuming, however, that the government has overcome the
foregoing legal and psychological difficulties and has established
criminal liability, what does the public obtain by way of relief?
27 United States v. The New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F.Supp. 626
(E. D. ]1M. 1946).28 This does not seem to be true of the opinion on appeal in the Circuit
Court, which based the defendant's liability on a broader theory of abuse of
vertical integration, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).29 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United
States, 330 U. S. 395 (1946).
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Merely a maximum fine of $5,000 for each count laboriously
brought home to each defendant. And I don't think the argument
would change much if the current bill providing for fines of up to
$50,000, in the discretion of the court, were to pass.
Assuming that there are enough defendants and counts to net
the public fisc the $250,000 obtained in fines in the American To-
bacco case, is that much of a recompense to the government for, let
us say, a 90 volume transcript, many years of prior investigation
by a large staff, and a delay of six years between the filing of the
indictment and final decision by the Supreme Court? On the other
side, are the defendants really much more inconvenienced in fact
than if they had to defend a civil proceeding, considering the heavy
financial impact of counsel fees, printing records, court costs, loss
of executives' time, etc? Thus, a single compilation needed in the
Investment Banking case is said to have cost the defendants $350,-
000.30 An executive of another antitrust defendant has stated that
defending his case in court cost his firm more than $100,000 in fees
and other expenses; seven other companies involved in the same
lawsuit, who had pleaded nolo contendere, each paid $5,000 fines.31
Over and above the high cost of defending government proceedings
is the very potent financial sanction of the private treble damage
suit; a single motion picture company has in a-thirty-year period
been in more than five hundred such proceedings, and paid out
(or had judgments entered against it for) more than ten million
dollars.32
There are two other considerations that in my mind serve fur-
ther to underscore the futility of many criminal antitrust proceed-
ings. It has been urged that criminal convictions are effective de-
terrents to antitrust violation because of the social stigma they
involve. I question this. It seems to me that a collectively managed
business, confronted with a criminal charge deodorized of moral
obloquy and hence not subject to strong public condemnation, may
cynically regard an antitrust fine as a mere cost of doing business
- as an occupational license fee. This is a particular danger since
a criminal proceeding inflicts a purely negative chastisement-
frequently more on the basis of an economic condition or state of
affairs than on specific acts of the defendants- without advancing
any positive suggestion as to how to change the status quo.
The cardinal point at issue is whether, in the language of Sec-
tion 4 of the Sherman Act, we mean to "prevent and restrain"
30McAlister, The Big Case: Procedurat Probleims of Antitrust Litigation,
64 HRv. L. REv. 27, 50 (1950).
s1 CoLrm's, March 15, 1952, p. 98.
32 
"Antitrust Cases Beginning in 1920 and Ending December 27, 1951 in
which 'Paramount' was Involved," F. C. C. Docket No. 10031 et aL, Para-
mount Exh. Nos. 9 and 9A.
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violations of the act. Section 4 itself points out that the way to do
so is to institute equity proceedings. There are, of course, situa-
tions where the criminal proceedings contemplated under Sections
1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act would have a deterrent effect and,
by indicating that the policeman is still on the beat, prevent some
of the simpler and more obvious forms of antitrust violation. Also,
there doubtless will still occur flagrant and clear-cut antitrust
violations where an equity injunction would be meaningless, be-
cause it could do little more than prohibit obvious forms of anti-
trust misbehavior - primary boycotts, strong-arm tactics, etc.
But the center of enforcement gravity is moving away from
these simple situations and their simple solutions. Antitrust liability
has become more and more a matter of statistical percentages and
the economics of market control. Results, not intentions, count. The
analysis that has become pertinent is sociological, not theological.3 3
And the business community, having a pro-competitive outlook,
genuinely regards competition as a valid public policy, and looks to
bench and bar for guidance as to how it may comply with general
antitrust directives, the application of which is sometimes not clear
in specific cases. Similarly, government is, or should be, concerned
with the rational projection into the future of the sort of free in-
dustrial society to which we all subscribe, rather than securing
personal retribution for past illegal restraints.
At this point, let me deal briefly with the second main part of
the case for civil antitrust proceedings- the way in which indus-
trial practices and business conditions have changed since the early
days of the Sherman Act.
When the Sherman Act was first passed and for some decades
thereafter, public opinion about it was largely molded by antip-
athy to industrial maneuvers of an imaginative but nevertheless
somewhat buccaneering nature. There was something brutal about
the tactics whereby dissident competitors were forced to sell out
or join the early trusts -railroad rebates, physical tampering with
competitors' machines, financial pressures, large scale trade dis-
paragement, "fighting ships" and "fighting brands," sustained price
cutting, and the other predatory practices that the early muckrakers
(with great justification) exploited. Farmers were afraid of the
33 In his Annual Report for 1937, Attorney General Cummings deprecated,
and attributed to "the search for that fictitious thing known as 'corporate in-
tent,' . . . an attitude commonly taken by courts, emphasizing moral culp-
ability and subordinating practical effects of business activities which tend to-
ward monopoly or restraint of trade .... In other words, actual results are ig-
nored in an effort to determine whether a fictitious personality is acting in
an evil state of mind. The antitrust laws have become theological tracts
on corporate morality." Except in some criminal antitrust cases, the courts
seem to have gotten away from this approach.
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high prices they would be charged, by the farm machinery, ferti-
lizer, and other trusts, for the machinery and supplies needed by
them in their agricultural operations, and the low prices they would
be getting for their own products because of trade manipulations
and restraints engaged in by other organized groups - the packers,
the wheat and grain speculators, the corn products combine. Con-
sumers were afraid of exorbitant prices and unavailability of sup-
plies - the odious abuses that had for centuries made common law
crimes of engrossing, regrating and forestalling.
This picture has I think on the whole changed. Human nature
has not become so spiritualized that there do not exist good cur-
rent examples of practices engaged in by antitrust violators at
which the ethically minded might well lift up their eyebrows -
attempts at commerical bribery (in the American Can case this was
euphemistically called "commercial massage") ;34 the assumption
by a company of conflicting interests involving betrayal of a fiduci-
ary relationship (as in the operations of the fruit and produce sub-
sidiary of the A&P);35 undue coziness with municipal officials (as
in the Gamewetl case).36 But on the whole the heyday of business
rapacity and predatory industrial practices has passed.
Modern industrial management is not interested in momentary
business coups or in fleecing consumers; it is interested in the con-
tinuity of successful business operations and the retention of pub-
lic favor. The decisions against AlcoaP and United Shoe38 indi-
cate that these adjudicated monopolists were satisfied with reason-
able profits. Du Pont (which has nonetheless had to defend itself
in an antitrust court) points to twenty reductions in the price of
cellophane, from $2.65 to $.50 a pound.39 The farmer and the worker
have, with government permission and support, become progres-
sively better organized into cooperatives, unions, and other associa-
tions, so that most of them can no longer be described as the easy
victims of efforts by antitrust violators to gouge or oppress them
or to deprive them of a fair return for their farm products or of a
fair wage.
In fact, although the protagonists of the antitrust laws still
point to the benefits that competition among producers confers on
the consumer, increased emphasis is being placed on the advantages
that competition has for the producer himself. Thus, large-scale
34 See supra, footnote 17 at page 28.
3S See supra, footnote 26.36 United States v. Gamewell, CCII TADE: R . REP. Surp. 1948-51, §
62,236.
37 See supra, footnote 9 at page 427.38 See supra, footnote 12 at page 325.
3 9 Address by 1r. Livingston, Public Relations Department, du Pont de
Nemours and Company, June 1950.
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American industry is beginning to follow the principle symbolized
by a bon mot credited to a General Electric executive -"If there
weren't a Westinghouse, we would have to create one." Of the eight
single-unit monopolies that dominated their respective industries
and were sued by the government in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, only the smallest (shoe machinery) now sur-
vives.40 One of these monopolies- the oil trust- has evolved into
an industry with twenty-one major competitors and countless
smaller ones. Mergers of a horizontal or vertical type are not, I
think, significantly on the increase.41 Public policy may still have
great difficulties with respect to the so-called "conglomerate merg-
er" of the last twenty years- the business enterprise producing
a host of diversified products- but they are of an entirely differ-
ent economic and legal order than those posed by the traditional
horizontal or vertical trusts or mergers of older times.42
Rather than take pride in the number of competitors that have
been eliminated or merged, du Pont and similarly placed firms re-
joice in the number of small fabricators that they keep in business
by supplying them with rayon, plastics, and other basic materials,
and the number of suppliers from whom they in turn draw their
basic raw materials.43 A prominent American corporation until
recently kept fragrant the recollection of a bygone day when a
nickel was a unit of exchange, while resolutely sticking to a one-
product policy and proudly pointing to the number of independent
bottlers it has established throughout the world.44 Other large-scale
enterprises emphasize the liberality with which they license patents
40 United States versus Economic Concentration and Monopoly, A Staff
Report to the Monopoly Sub-Committee of the House Small Business Com-
mittee Pursuant to IL R. 64 79th Congress.
41 This statement is, of course, a debatable and somewhat meaningless
one until measures of horizontal and vertical concentration become more
refined. It seems to the writer, however, to reflect the viewpoint of the
majority of the economists who have written about the problem. This is
not the occasion to discuss the many economic and statistical problems in-
volved.
42 Cf., e.g., Andrews, Product Diversification and the Public Interest, 29
HAuv. Bus. Rxv. 91 (1951).
4 3 President Greenewalt of du Pont has pointed out, for example, that
$1.92 of nylon staple, in producing a $49.95 dress, keeps countless spinners,
throwsters, weavers, finishers, designers, cutters and retail stores in busi-
ness. Statement before House Judiciary Committee on Study of Monopoly
Power, November 15, 1949. He also stated that cellophane has over 6,000 cus-
tomers, of which only a hundred are in the category of big companies like the
bakers, tobacco people, and meat packers, and that over 300 firms converted
40 per cent of du Pont cellophane into tape, bags, envelopes, tubes, etc.
4 4 Arnold, "Depression: Not in your Lifetime," 131 COLLma's 24, 26 (25
Apr. 1953).
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to competitors,45 or their relatively small percentage occupation of
an industrial field, or the extent to which they foster the competi-
tive instinct among even unincorporated subdivisions within their
own enterprises.46 Some analysts have been emphasizing the need
for large firms sloughing off certain kinds of business operations,
and this has taken place in the automobile, meat packing, and as-
bestos industries.47
The current attitude of the enlightened American producer to
the American antitrust laws is typified by Paul Hoffman when he
points out that:
...the, antitrust laws have played a major part in the de-
velopment of America, and for a rather basic reason. I said
this morning that I believed one of the reasons for the ex-
istence of a dynamic society and one of its objectives should
be the promotion of challenge, and promotion of pressures
that would make individuals realize all their capacities.
To my mind that is the great contribution of competi-
tion. I perhaps take a rather dim view of the willingness
of most of us - and I include myself, certainly - to work,
and particularly to think, unless there is some pressure
that drives us to it! I really feel that almost no thinking is
done when you get to the place where, if you do not start
thinking, you will either go broke or lose your competitive
position. When that happens you really will think. Com-
petition has probably resulted, over the last 50 years, in a
great outburst of mental activity which would never have
taken place without it; and that is in no small way re-
sponsible for what we have accomplished in the way of
material development 8
Similarly, thoughtful business men have been condemning trade
restraints and restrictions because they retard productivity and
technological advance. While the conventional criteria of abuse of
economic power and trade restraint must still be kept in mind, the
4S See address by Charles E. Wilson, President, General Electric Com-
pany, before the Rotary Club of New York City, November 3, 1949 with respect
to licensing of Disposall patents to competitors. In the cellophane field du
Pont has built a $20,000,000 plant for Olin Industries Inc., see New York
Times, November 7, 1949; New York Herald Tribune, August 28, 1951.
46 Thus, Mr. Greenewalt has stated that du Pont has roughly eight per
cent of the trade in the "chemicals and allied products' field and has larger
rivals in the paint, rayon, plastics, nitrogen products, photographic films,
chlorine products and insecticide fields.
47 See Drucker, The Concept of the Corporation (1946); Why Not Compete
With Yourself?, THE Ml AGEMmm REvmw, October 1949, pages 551-3. The
Cleanup Man, 62 Time, No. 14, pages 92 et seq. This viewpoint is not shared
by Bowman, Towards Less Monopoly, 101 U. or PA. L. REv. 577, at 604-5 (1953).
4 8 See Kaplan and Kahn, Big Business in a Competitive Society, FoRuNE,
section 2, February 1953, page 13; Powlison, Obstacles to Business Growth,
31 HA v. Bus. REv. 48,50 (1953).
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basic objective of current antitrust policy, borne out, I think, by
the nature of some of the important new cases in the field, has
come to be, to borrow the language of a relatively recent United
Kingdom statute on the point, the production, treatment, and dis-
tribution of goods by the most efficient and economical means and
the fullest use and best distribution of men, materials, and ca-
pacity.49 As antitrust in legal terms thus becomes a matter of de-
sirable public policy rather than of personal guilt, it moves, in
philosophic terms, in the direction of what Aristotle has called
"distributive justice," as contrasted with "punitive justice." And, if
I am correct in describing this trend, government can no longer
be content with the merely negative and retrospective attitude
that is implicit in criminal condemnation. It must assume the af-
firmative role of suggesting to antitrust violators, albeit in broad
outlines and with the utmost latitude for independent business
discretion, the general future course of business conduct as it af-
fects the competitive process.
This latter is what the modern equity antitrust decree does.
Nobody desires or expects of an equity court a blueprint for the
future conduct of any industrial segment of our dynamic American
society. But we expect our government to insist on maintaining
the flexibility and opportunities for healthy business growth that
are only possible if one safeguards the freedom of economic choice.
The preservation of competition calls for the art of stimulating
creative business endeavor as an alternative to regimenting it.
No amount of nominal criminal penalties could, I think, ac-
complish anything near the public good which is done when a large
national company, obligated by court decree to increase the number
of its distributors by 10% in a five year period, ends up with a
29% increase;5 0 or an equipment manufacturer who had coerced
purchasers of its equipment to take trade mark franchises from it
finds the frequency of such trade mark franchises dwindling from
70% to 1% of its total sales in the three-year period since antitrust
49 Hoffman-H v. Bus. Rsv. (1952). Professor Wright puts the case
more forcefully. He refers to "the law of decay of self-perpetuating non-com-
petitive groups," as stated by a famous English biologist-" .. . where you
have a very comfortable ruling group all cooperating very nicely, promotion
will tend to go to the 'nice boys' rather than the able boys; [that] scientific
innovation is discouraged as much as technical change." And he ends by
saying, "We need a ministry of Disturbance, a regulated source of annoy-
ance, a destroyer of routine, an underminer of complacency, an enfant ter-
rible." Competition-More or Less? Cmmuw Busnqss STUDm, Oct. 1952,
pp. 27, 29.
50 See section 14 (a) of United Kingdom Monopolies and Restrictive
,Practices Inquiry and Control Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 Ch. 66.
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judgment was entered against it.51 A fine levied against an anti-
trust defendant does less for the public interest than, let us say,
a 50% increase in the sales of a competitor in the year following
entry of a civil judgment,52 or a tenfold increase in imports into
this country by a single British company within a similar one year
span,53 or the entry of an American firm into foreign markets that
had been previously believed impregnable.5 4
On the whole, therefore, an informed, imaginative, and for-
ward-looking application of antitrust equity jurisprudence will do
more to reconcile the current situation, needs and temperament of
the enlightened business community with the basic spirit and pur-
pose of the antitrust laws, than the assessment of criminal sanctions
against antitrust violators, stripped as so many present day anti-
trust violations are of the psychological malice and moral obtuse-
ness that people still expect as a basis for a criminal proceeding.55
S Under the Consent Final Judgment in United States v. Libbey-Owens-
Ford (N.D. Ohio), CCH TRADE REG. REP. Suep. 1948-1951, 62,323 (1948).
52 Under the Consent Final Judgment in United States v. Bendix Home
Appliances, CCH 1948-1949 TAuE CAsEs 62,346 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
53 Under the Final Judgment in United States v. American Can Co., 87
F.Supp. 18, (N.D. Cal. 1949). See Wall Street Journal, Oct. 15, 1951.
54 See United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries Inc., 105 F.Supp. 215,
229 (S.D. N. Y. 1952).
55 See Timberg, Competition -A Philosophy for Export and for Defense
Production, 21 GEo. WAsH. L. R v. 677, 692-3 (1953).
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